Rules-based monetary policy evaluation has long been central to macroeconomics. Using the original Taylor rule, a modified Taylor rule with a higher output gap coefficient, and an estimated Taylor rule, we define rules-based and discretionary eras by smaller and larger policy rule deviations, the absolute value of the difference between the actual federal funds rate and the federal funds rate prescribed by the three rules. We use tests for multiple structural changes to identify the eras so that knowledge of subsequent economic outcomes cannot influence the choice of the dates. With the original Taylor rule, monetary policy in the U.S. is characterized by a rules-based era until 1974, a discretionary era from 1974 to 1985, a rules-based era from 1985 to 2000, and a discretionary era from 2001 to 2013. With the modified Taylor rule, the rules-based era extends further into the 1970s and there is an additional rules-based period starting in 2006. We calculate various loss functions and find that economic performance is uniformly better during rules-based eras than during discretionary eras, and that the original Taylor rule provides the largest loss during discretionary periods relative to loss during rules-based periods.
Introduction
Rules-based monetary policy evaluation has long been central to macroeconomics, as evidenced by the seminal work of Friedman (1960) , Kydland and Prescott (1977) , and Taylor (1993) . Extensive research has evaluated policy rules in the context of a variety of models, compared simple rules with optimal policy, and investigated the robustness of various rules. 1 This paper focuses on deviations from rules-based policy. We calculate deviations from a variety of monetary policy rules, propose a statistical method for delineating "rules-based" and "discretionary" eras, and compare economic performance between the two eras.
There are a potentially infinite number of ways to specify policy rules, calculate deviations from the rules, and quantify the effects of deviations. In order to make the scope of this paper manageable, we will focus on three rules. The first is the Taylor (1993) rule, where the federal funds rate equals 1.0 plus 1.5 times inflation plus 0.5 times the output gap. The second is the Taylor rule with a coefficient of 1.0 on the output gap. We call this rule the "modified Taylor rule". 2 The third is a policy rule derived from an estimated Taylor rule. While the estimated coefficients on inflation and the output gap are very close to Taylor's original postulated coefficients, the intercept is smaller, implying a higher inflation target.
In order to study deviations from rules-based policy, it is necessary to make a distinction between rules-based and discretionary eras. With qualitative methods, there is always the danger that, since the economic performance outcomes are known, periods with good economic performance will be identified as rules-based while periods of bad economic performance will be characterized as discretionary. In this paper, we implement a statistical methodology for dividing monetary policy into "small" and "large" deviations periods instead of choosing the eras a priori.
First, we calculate policy rule deviations, the absolute value of the difference between the federal funds rate and the interest rate implied by the various rules. Next, using tests for structural change, we identify periods where the deviations are small and periods where the deviations are large. Since neither the number nor the dates of the periods is specified a priori, prior knowledge of economic outcomes cannot affect the results.
We use real-time data that was available to policymakers when interest rate decisions were made for as long a period as possible. We use real-time real GDP (or GNP) and GDP (or GNP) deflator data from the Philadelphia Fed starting in 1965:Q4, when the data begins, and ending in 2013:Q4. We replace the federal funds rate with the shadow federal funds rate calculated by Wu and Xia (2013) starting in 2009:Q1 after the federal funds rate was constrained by the zero lower bound. We calculate inflation as the four-quarter percentage change in the GDP deflator and the output gap as the deviation from a real-time quadratic trend. We show that the real-time quadratic detrended output gaps provide a closer approximation to "reasonable" real-time output gaps, calculated using Okun's Law, than alternatives including real-time linear
and Hodrick-Prescott detrending.
We identify monetary policy eras by allowing for changes in the mean of the policy rule deviations with Bai and Perron (1998) tests for multiple structural breaks and Perron and Qu (2006) tests for multiple restricted structural changes, which restrict the mean of the deviations in the small and large deviations periods to be the same. There is no necessity that a particular policy rule will produce rules-based and discretionary eras. In order for a policy rule to define rules-based and discretionary eras, four criteria need to be satisfied. First, there needs to be at least two statistically significant unrestricted changes in the mean of the policy rule deviations.
3 Second, the confidence intervals for the break dates cannot overlap. Third, the dates of the restricted and the unrestricted structural changes should be approximately the same. If this condition is violated but the direction of the breaks is the same with and without the restrictions, we define rules-based and discretionary eras using the Bai and Perron tests with the caveat that size of the deviations within each of the eras are not the same. Fourth, the means of the deviations in the two eras determined by the restricted tests need to be statistically different from each other.
For the original Taylor rule, the structural change tests identify significant breaks in 1974:Q3, 1985:Q1, and 2000:Q4. The results for the restricted structural change tests are almost identical, producing rules-based ears for 1966 -1974 and 1985 -2000 and discretionary eras for 1974 -1984 and 2001 -2013 . These eras are similar to the eras identified by qualitative methods in Meltzer (2011) and Taylor (2012) . The mean of the deviations is about 1.0 percent for the rules-based eras and 2.5 percent for the discretionary eras, with the difference statistically significant. The rules-based and discretionary eras closely correspond to periods where the deviations are below and above two percent.
There are some striking differences in the results for the modified Taylor rule with a higher output gap coefficient. The most important difference is that there is a significant break in We analyze the effects of deviations from rules-based policies by comparing economic performance between our estimated rules-based and discretionary eras. Using six loss functions involving inflation and unemployment: Okun's misery index, a linear absolute loss function, and four quadratic loss functions, we show that economic performance is better in rules-based than in discretionary eras. The results hold for all six rules and are robust to specifications of quadratic loss functions that put greater weight on either inflation or unemployment loss and to a specification that puts all weight on inflation loss.
While economic performance is always better in rules-based eras than in discretionary eras, the effects of the deviations differ systematically among the rules. The ratio of the loss during discretionary eras to the loss during rules-based eras is largest for the original Taylor rule, next largest for the modified Taylor rule, and smallest for the estimated Taylor rule. Using the original Taylor rule as a benchmark provides the sharpest evidence of the negative effects of deviating from policy rules. Taylor (1993) proposed the following monetary policy rule,
Policy Rule Deviations with Real-Time Data
where t i is the target level of the short-term nominal interest rate, t π is the inflation rate, π is the target level of inflation, t y is the output gap, the percent deviation of actual real GDP from an estimate of its potential level, and R is the equilibrium level of the real interest rate. Taylor postulated that the output and inflation gaps enter the central bank's reaction function with equal weights of 0.5 and that the equilibrium level of the real interest rate and the inflation target were both equal to 2 percent, producing the following equation,
We define Taylor rule deviations as the absolute value of the difference between the actual federal funds rate and the interest rate target implied by the original Taylor rule with the above coefficients. A rules-based era would have small deviations while an discretionary era would have large deviations. In our empirical work below, "large" and "small" are determined endogenously in the context of our statistical methods. The three leading methods of detrending are linear, quadratic, and Hodrick-Prescott (HP).
Real-time output gaps using these methods are depicted in Figure 1 . In contrast with output gaps constructed using revised data, where the trends are estimated for the entire sample, there is no necessity for the positive output gaps to equal the negative output gaps. While there are considerable differences among the gaps, the negative output gaps correspond closely with NBER recession dates for all three methods. (1999, 2007) . The shadow federal funds rate is below the implied Taylor rule rate for 2010 -
2013.
The most widely used alternative to the original Taylor rule increases the size of the coefficient on the output gap from 0.5 to 1.0, producing the following specification.
We call this rule the modified Taylor rule. Taylor (1999b) analyzed deviations from this rule along with the original Taylor rule. Using the real-time data described above, the estimated rule is as follows, independently identify the inflation target and the equilibrium real interest rate in Equation (1) from the estimates in Equation (4). If, however, you are willing to assume a value for the equilibrium real interest rate, you can back out a value for the inflation target (or vice versa).
Assuming that the equilibrium real interest rate equals Taylor's postulated value of 2 percent, the implied inflation target is 3.33 percent, considerably larger than Taylor's 2 percent inflation target.
Deviations from the estimated Taylor rule are depicted in Figure 4 . Panel A shows the federal funds rate (actual and shadow) and the estimated Taylor rule rate implied by Equation (4). Panel B illustrates the difference between the actual and implied rates, and Panel C depicts the estimated Taylor rule deviations, the absolute value of the differences shown in Panel B.
8 The results for 1974-1975 differ from those in Taylor (1999b) because we use real-time data with quadratic detrending while he uses revised data with HP detrending. Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy and Papell (2013) provide further discussion. 9 When estimating Taylor rules, it is common practice to have a weighted average of the lagged federal funds rate and the Taylor rule variables. These estimates, however, produce long-run multipliers on inflation and the output gap, which are not appropriate for specifying a policy rule. Alternatively, the lagged interest rate could be added as an exogenous variable in Equation (4). As with the interest-rate-smoothing rules discussed above, the policy rule derived from these estimates could not distinguish between rules-based and discretionary eras.
Since the coefficients on inflation and the output gap are nearly identical for the original and estimated Taylor rules, the implied federal funds rate is about 0.63 percentage points lower for the estimated than for the original rule. This decreases the deviations for the estimated compared with the original rule for the periods in the 1970s, 2000s, and 2010s when the federal funds rate is below the rate implied by the original Taylor rule and increases the deviations for the early 1980s when the federal funds rate is above the rate implied by the original Taylor rule.
Structural Change Tests for Rules-Based and Discretionary Eras
In order to identify monetary policy eras, we use Perron (1998, 2003a,b) tests for multiple structural breaks, allowing for changes in the mean of the deviations. We consider the following multiple linear regressions with m structural breaks (m+1 regimes):
where d t are the policy rule deviations from Equations (2) - (4) 
3.a. Original Taylor Rule
With the original Taylor rule, we find three significant breaks in the mean of the deviations and, therefore, four regimes. The results for the Bai and Perron (1998) One question that naturally arises is whether the breaks define distinct regimes. In order to answer this question, we report confidence intervals around the break dates in Table 1 By imposing these constraints, we restrict the mean of the deviations in the two rulesbased eras to be the same (µ 1 = µ 3 ) and the two discretionary eras to be the same (µ 2 = µ 4 ). In order to test for the existence of structural change, we use the supremum F-test of no structural 11 The results for the original Taylor rule, as well as estimates using Markov-switching models, are in NikolskoRzhevskyy, Papell, and Prodan (2014). change (m = 0) against an alternative of m = three restricted structural changes. The estimates of the restricted break dates are constructed as the global minimizers of the restricted SSR using the method of Bai and Perron (2003b) . As previously, we use a value of the trimming parameter ߝ = 0.15. Asymptotic critical values are simulated.
The results are reported in Table 1 The differences between the rules-based and discretionary eras are economically as well as statistically significant. The Taylor rule deviations are almost three times larger in the discretionary eras than in the rules-based eras using Perron and Qu tests and are almost four times larger in the most discretionary era (1974 to 1984) than in the least discretionary era (1985 to 2000) using Bai and Perron tests.
3.b. Modified Taylor Rule
With the modified Taylor rule, we find four significant breaks in the mean of the deviations and, therefore, five regimes. The results for the Bai and Perron (1998) We also performed the Perron and Qu (2006) restricted structural change test for the deviations from the modified Taylor rule. Since there are four significant breaks with the Bai and Perron (1998) test, we add an additional break and restriction to Equations (5) - (7):
By imposing these constraints, we restrict the mean of the deviations in the three rules-based eras to be the same (µ 1 = µ 3 = µ 5 ) and the two discretionary eras to be the same (µ 2 = µ 4 ).
The results are reported in Table 2 (b) and illustrated in Figure 5 . As with the original Taylor rule, we find that the break dates are nearly identical with the ones found when testing for unrestricted changes: 1977:Q2, 1984:Q3, 1999 
3.c. Estimated Taylor Rule
Since both the original and the modified Taylor rules are normative, they do not necessarily reflect monetary policy practiced by the Fed. We also evaluate a "positive" rule which is derived from the estimated interest rate reaction function using real-time data in Equation (4). As discussed above, while the coefficients on inflation and the output gap are very close to those of the original Taylor rule, the intercept is much smaller, implying a higher inflation target.
As with the normative rules, we test for structural change in the deviations of the (estimated) policy rule. The results for the Bai and Perron (1998) violating one of our conditions for a policy rule to produce rules-based and discretionary eras.
Since the direction of the breaks is the same with and without the restrictions and the other conditions are satisfied, we use the breaks from the unrestricted tests to depict rules-based and discretionary eras in Figure 5 , with the caveat that size of the deviations within each of the eras are not the same.
Policy Evaluation for Rules-Based and Discretionary Eras
We have identified rules-based and discretionary eras by conducting tests for structural change of the deviations from three policy rules: the original Taylor rule, a modified Taylor rule with a higher output gap coefficient, and an estimated Taylor rule. We proceed to compare economic performance in two dimensions -between rules-based and discretionary eras for each policy rule and among the three policy rules.
Corresponding to the Fed's dual mandate, macroeconomic performance is usually evaluated in terms of inflation and unemployment. Typically, a loss function is calculated as the sum of inflation loss and unemployment loss, with the better policy being the one that produces a smaller loss function.
We calculate six loss functions. The best-known loss function is the Okun misery index, which is simply the sum of inflation and unemployment, so inflation loss equals the inflation rate and unemployment loss equals the unemployment rate. This loss function, however, assumes that optimal inflation and unemployment are both zero, which does not account for either a preference for low inflation over zero inflation or for the natural rate hypothesis. We therefore calculate a linear absolute loss function, where inflation loss is the absolute value of inflation minus target inflation, which we assume equals two percent, and unemployment loss is the absolute value of unemployment minus the natural rate of unemployment. Next, we report a quadratic loss function, where inflation loss is inflation minus target inflation squared and unemployment loss is unemployment minus the natural rate of unemployment squared.
Compared to the linear loss function, the quadratic loss function favors moderate inflation and unemployment over high inflation and low unemployment or low inflation and high unemployment.
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While the three loss functions place equal weight on inflation and unemployment loss, there are many other possibilities. Woodford (2003) , for example, argues that for quadratic loss functions, the weight on inflation loss should be much higher than the weight on unemployment loss. Conversely, Grant (2013) uses survey data to estimate that the public values a one percentage point decrease in unemployment as much as a two to five percentage point decrease in inflation, and argues that this is consistent with studies of the macroeconomics of happiness.
We investigate the robustness of our results to alternative weights by calculating quadratic loss functions with a weight of 3:1 on inflation loss relative to unemployment loss and a weight of 3:1 on unemployment loss relative to inflation loss. Finally, we consider a quadratic loss function where all of the weight is placed on inflation loss. Since we are evaluating policy outcomes, we use currently available (revised) data for inflation, unemployment, and the natural rate of unemployment rather than real-time data.
The average loss during discretionary eras is uniformly greater than the average loss during policy rule eras. As reported in Table 4 , this holds for each of the 18 possible cases -six loss functions times three policy rules. The magnitude of the loss differences is substantial. For 12 Woodford (2003) discusses the theoretical advantages of quadratic loss functions. 13 All of our quadratic loss functions are included in the general quadratic loss function used by Taylor (1979) . While economic performance in rules-based eras is uniformly better than economic performance in discretionary eras, there are substantial differences among the policy rules. Table   4 also reports the ratio of the average loss during discretionary eras to the average loss during rules-based eras. Since all of the ratios are positive, a higher value for a given loss function means that the rule provides a sharper delineation between rules-based and discretionary eras.
The loss ratio for the original Taylor rule is greater than the loss ratio for the modified Taylor rule for all six loss functions and, in turn, the loss ratio for the modified Taylor rule is greater than the loss ratio for the estimated Taylor rule for five of the six loss functions. 14 In every case, the original Taylor rule provides the strongest evidence of the costs of deviating from rules-based policy.
Conclusions
Comparison of rules-based and discretionary monetary policy has been central to macroeconomics since the publication of the seminal Kydland and Prescott (1977) as the ad hoc era. He argues that economic performance in the rules-based period was vastly superior to that in the ad hoc period and, while correlation does not prove causation, the timing of events supports the interpretation that (good or bad) policy causes (good or bad) economic performance rather than causation going in the opposite direction.
The first purpose of this paper is to statistically identify rules-based and discretionary periods. We calculate deviations from three policy rules: the original Taylor rule, a modified
Taylor rule with a higher output gap coefficient, and an estimated Taylor rule, and identify rulesbased and discretionary eras using tests for unrestricted and restricted structural change that rely solely on the data so that prior knowledge of economic outcomes cannot affect the results. With the original Taylor rule, the division between rules-based and discretionary eras is broadly consistent with Taylor While this is in accord with our findings that systematic deviations from rules-based policy are detrimental, it does not go far enough. The choice among policy rules matters. In order to maximize the benefit from rules-based policy, the Fed should choose the rule with the largest difference in economic loss between discretionary and rules-based periods. In the class of the rules we studied, that choice is the original Taylor rule. 
